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INTERNATIONAL NOTES
Early in May, 1975, the United States weekly The 
Guardian published a major and critica l statement 
on China's foreign policy by Australian journalist, 
Wilfred Burchett. The article is reprinted here. 
Burchett is primarily concerned with China’s 
response to Angola. The fact that he is a known 
friend of China and has recently spent much time 
covering events inside Angola adds weight to his 
views.
About the same time that Burchett’s article was 
first published the Overseas Press Club of New York 
awarded its prize for the best book on foreign affairs 
to Phillip Knightly, another Australian. The book has 
a lengthy title  - "The First Casualty, The War 
Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist and Myth 
Maker from the Crimea to Vietnam” . As this 
indicates, the author examines the role of the war 
correspondent in the last 120 years and concludes 
that the “ facts” most people read, and from which 
they understand history, are dubious indeed.
There are honorable exceptions among war 
correspondents and Knightly names as one of these 
W ilfred  B u rch e tt. B urche tt was the f irs t  
correspondent to describe the atomic bombing of 
Hiroshima. His report in the Daily Express of 
S ep tem ber 5, 1945 gave the f irs t  g ra p h ic  
descriptions of atomic destruction and made the 
first references to what is now known as radiation 
sickness. Not surprisingly, Burchett’s story was 
immediately denied by various United States 
authorities and he was accused of falling victim  to 
Japanese propaganda.
In later years he was not only accused of falling 
victim  to Chinese, Russian, Korean and Vietnamese 
propaganda, but various inspired stories have 
charged him with being an “agent” of these 
communist governments. Burchett has been 
subjected to considerable vilification but Knightly's 
book adds one more piece of hard evidence that his 
reports from Korea and Vietnam were generally 
accurate and that his analysis has been borne out by 
history. Few war correspondents receive this 
judgment from Knightly.
This does not mean that Burchett’s opinions on 
China’s present foreign policy are correct but they 
should be assessed as coming from a friend of China 
and raising some very pertinent questions.
China's current foreign policy has been a 
subject of broad discussion throughout the 
world ever since the Angola crisis.
As a person who has written about and 
defended the Chinese revolution since its 
inception, I would like to make a few 
preliminary comments about the Peking 
government’s present international line.
My starting point is that China has made and 
does make errors in its foreign policy. No 
government or policy is capable of being 
entirely correct all the time.
For instance, one of the severe casualities in 
the cultural revolution of the late 1960s was 
Chinese foreign policy. The career - and 
perhaps even the life - of Foreign Minister 
Chen Yi was saved by the vigorous defense 
waged on his behalf by the late Premier Chou 
En-lai. For a brief period, even Chou was 
virtually deposed and chaos resulted.
This was the ultra-“ left” period now 
criticised by the Chinese themselves as 
“ making revolution by breaking diplomatic 
relations" - and it contributed towards China's 
isolation. At the same time, the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam was attacked for even 
considering peace negotiations with the US. 
President Ho Chi Minh was reviled at certain 
public meetings in China for “selling out the 
south” . Some Vietnamese diplomats were 
ac tua lly  phys ica lly  a ttacked . F raternal 
relations with the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea and friendly relations with 
ne ighbou ring , neutra l C am bod ia  were 
seriously jeopardized during the short reign of 
these ultra-“ leftists” .
The proponents of this erroneous foreign 
line were afterwards severely punished - and 
after a long series of personal initiatives by 
Premier Chou, the damage was repaired.
One or the merits of this period of u ltra-“ left” 
domination of foreign policy was that the 
mistakes were quickly perceived, admitted 
and corrected. Today, in my view, China is 
making some serious mistakes and getting 
deeper and deeper into the mire by trying to 
defend them.
- M.R. Many friends of China have been troubled
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by what nas appeared to them to be Peking's 
abstention from the international diplomatic 
and economic boycott of the fascist Pinochet 
regime in Chile.
This has now been followed by Angola, 
where China made an error of extreme 
dimensions. Lack of judgment in favoring the 
FNLA of Holden Roberto, long after it was 
recognised (in Peking as elsewhere) that 
Roberto was a creature of the CIA, has now 
been compounded by false versions as to what 
is happening in Angola today. The result is 
another very serious decline in China's 
prestige in the African sector of the third world 
and a general lack of confidence in China’s 
version of what goes on in various parts of the 
world.
There is no evidence to suggest linking 
these errors to the current ideological 
struggles in China, but since one of the 
consequences of the present internal situation 
has been to set up a commission at the 
Communist Party central committee level to 
investigate rightest errors, many of China’s 
closest supporters would breathe a sigh of 
relief if this included a review of such errors in 
the field of foreign policy.
For instance, making aid to national 
liberation movements or friendship to certain 
governments conditional on denunciation of 
“Soviet social-imperialism” is to run the risk of 
recruiting the opportunist riff-ra ff of the world. 
To make such demands would have been 
correctly qualified by the Chinese leadership a 
few years ago as inadmissible interference in 
the in te rna l a ffa irs  o f a co un try  or 
organisation. But that such criteria have been 
offered is an open secret. The Chinese may 
well argue that their adversarifes have done the 
same for years - but a policy of “only those who 
denounce our enemies are our friends” is a 
very poor basis for foreign policy.
Errors, o the rw ise  ine xp licab le , have 
occurred as a result. In the summer of 1971, for 
instance, a top-level delegation of Angola’s 
MPLA was very well received in Peking. It 
included MPLA president Agostinho Neto and 
secretary-general Lucio Lara. They explained 
the situation inside their country and the role 
of the three independence movements.
Premier Chou and some of his top aides 
listened attentively as it was explained that 
UNITA was little more than a Portugese 
puppet organization; that the FNLA was a 
puppet of the CIA. Regarding UNITA, Chou 
En-lai showed some reserve, but told the
MPLA leaders that if they could document 
their charges appropriate action would be 
taken. As for the FNLA, Chou En-lai stated: 
“We know Holden Roberto is a self-declared 
agent of US imperialism.
The MPLA leaders asked for some military 
aid, including transport. M ilitary aid was 
immediately accorded, but - with China’s 
commitment to Indochina - they were advised 
to seek transport elsewhere. On the last day of 
their visit, however, word came from Chou En- 
lai that some transport would also be included 
in the m ilitary aid. Everything seemed fine. But 
then came increased aid, including military 
instructors, for Holden Roberto’s FNLA.
Absolute proof that UNITA was a tool of 
Portuguese neo-colonialism was sent to 
Peking shortly after the anti-fascist coup in 
Portugal two years ago this April. They came 
from the PIDE secret police files, directly from 
one of the leading personalities of the Armed 
Forces Movement who had good reasons to 
know of the confidential relations between 
U NITA leader Jonas Savimbi and the 
Portuguese High Command in Angola. 
(Correspondence between Savimbi and top 
Portuguese military officers proved what the 
MPLA leadership knew from bitter experience
- direct Portuguese-UNITA m ilitary co­
operation aimed at wiping out the MPLA’s 
armed forces.)
In May 1975, there was another top level 
MPLA delegation in Peking. By this time 
Premier Chou En-lai was already hospitalized. 
The discussions took place with a deputy 
prime minister (not Teng Hsiao-ping) and a 
deputy foreign minister - both of whom were 
present at the meeting four years earlier. They 
w e re  r e m in d e d  o f C h o u  E n - la i ’ s 
characterisation of Holden Roberto and asked 
how it was possible that aid had been 
intensified when it was public knowledge that 
this aid was being used in an attempt to 
exterminate the MPLA. Photographic and 
other documentary evidence was presented of 
FNLA atrocities against MPLA supporters in 
and around Luandasincethe Alvor Agreement 
of January 10, 1975.
There was apparently a cold response to this 
and a standard reply that the MPLA should 
abide by the Alvor Agreement, which Portugal 
had signed with the three movements, 
providing for a transitional three-party 
coalition government until independence on 
Nov. 11, 1975. Patient explanations that the
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MPLA had done everything possible to insure 
the strict implementation of the agreement but 
tha t the FN LA-U N ITA  fo rces - at the 
instigation of the US - were simply bent on 
exterminating them, fell on deaf ears. Through 
the m ilitary instructors China had at Holden 
Roberto’s Kinkuzu base in Zaire, Peking was 
apparently well informed as to the real role of 
both President Mobutu and Holden Roberto.
FNLA AID  ENDED
China stopped aiding the FNLA in 1975 and 
withdrew its m ilitary instructors on the 
commendable grounds that the aid had been 
supplied to help Angolans fight Portuguese 
colonialism but that once independence had 
been won, no more military aid was necessary 
and the three movements should get together 
on the basis of the Alvor Agreement and stop 
fighting each other. This was the position 
taken by Chinese diplomats abroad with 
whom one discussed the matter. In principle it 
was a just and defensible position. As in 
Mozambique and elsewhere - notably in 
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia - Chinese aid 
had been given to help the peoples of Angola, 
Mozambique and Indochina in their anti­
imperialist, national liberation struggles.
I attended the Alvor Conference and the 
agreement was a good one, just as was the 
Paris Agreement to end the war in Vietnam. 
But it depended on the goodwill and sincerity 
of all the signatories. The FNLA and UNITA 
supported to the hilt by the US, behaved 
exactly like the Thieu regime in South Vietnam 
and used the Alvor Agreement to step up their 
attempts to wipe, out the MPLA and set 
themselves up as neo-colonialist puppets. 
China should have had all the necessary data- 
and Peking’s best friends at state and 
government level in Africa contributed to 
ensuring that it did have-to know that only the 
MPLA had a truly national, all-Angolan as well 
as a truly all-African and internationalist 
position.
C h in a ’s ow n  e x p e r ie n c e  w ith  th e  
Kuomintang, and over the borders in Korea 
and the countries of Indochina, should have 
been sufficient for the leadership to know that 
agreement between patriots and traitors is 
impossible. One can try it, as the PRG of South 
Vietnam sincerely did with the Thieu regime in 
Saigon and as the MPLA did with the FNLA- 
UNITA in Angola, even if only to demonstrate 
to the public who is for national unity and true 
independence and who is against it. But such
an unnatural alliance can never work for long. 
And the blunt truth is that Chinese arms in 
FNLA hands were not used against the 
Portuguese but against the MPLA.
One error leads to another and the Chinese 
version of events at the recent UN Security 
Council meeting called to examine the case of 
South African agression against Angola is an 
outstanding example of this. First of all it ran 
counter to the truth and chronology of events 
as confirmed by all eyewitness accounts, plus 
official documentation. Secondly it put China 
in the unenviable position of at least partly 
letting racist South Africa off the hook for 
invading Angola by putting the principal 
blame on the USSR for “opening the door” to 
Pretoria's aggression.
Let’s briefly review a factual timetable of 
events in Angola. First, MPLA had been 
fighting against Portugese colonialism since 
the early 1960s. Since The Guardian has so 
often documented the struggle from this 
period until the anti-fascist coup in Portugal in 
1974 there is no need to recapitulate this 
period. Suffice to say MPLA was recognised 
by virtually the entire world as the legitimate 
national liberation organisation in Angola and 
had close ties - which it still enjoys today - with 
the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau, Frelimo in 
M ozam bique and m ost of the w o r ld ’s 
liberation organisations and progressive 
countries. From the early 1960s on, MPLA 
received Soviet aid and help from the Cubans 
as well, among others.
Deeply distrustful, for good reason, of the 
FNLA and UNITA, MPLA agreed in good faith 
to at least experiment with unity proposals put 
forward by the Organisation of African Unity 
follow ing the defeat of Portuguese fascism - 
leading toward the possibility of a unity 
government when Angola's independence 
was to be declared in November 1975.
SECRET SH IPM EN TS
The ink, quite literally, was not even dry on 
the Alvor Agreement before the CIA began its 
secret shipments of arms and money to the 
FN LA-U N ITA n eo co lon ia lis ts . The US 
government has admitted this. It is simply not 
true that the Soviet Union destroyed Alvor by 
immense shipments to one organization. The 
USSR did ship small quantities of materials to 
the MPLA as it had been doing for a decade, 
but the big deliveries didn't occur until quite a 
b it la ter in the year when it became
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unmistakably evident the FNLA-UNITA were 
getting massive support from the US, Zaire 
and South Africa. Then:
March 1975: Troops of the regular Zairese 
army invaded Angola and established Holden 
Roberto in nominal power in Carmona (Uije) 
and other towns of northern Angola.
August 1975: South African troops crossed 
into Angola from their bases in illegally- 
occupied South-West Africa (Namibia), 
setting up bases in Cuangar and Calai.
O ctober 23, 1975: Troops of the regular 
South African army, supported by one brigade 
of armored cars and one artillery brigade drive 
north 1000 miles before being halted by MPLA 
forces at the Queve river just south of Gabela.
Novem ber 7 and 10: Regular troops of the 
Zaire army, supported  by Portuguese 
mercenaries and spearheaded by South 
African armored cars drive to within 15m ilesof 
Luanda but were driven back each time - by 
MPLA troops.
November 10 and 11: The MPLA declares 
independence and the setting up of the 
People's R epub lic  of A ngo la . As an 
independent and sovereign state, the PRA 
requests Cuban and Soviet help, in driving 
back the South African and Zairese troops.
Even the United States has admitted that 
Soviet arms for the MPLA arrived after 
Washington was secretly supplying some $32 
million worth of m ilitary supplies to the FNLA 
and UNITA forces. To defend the South 
African invasion as a reaction to Soviet-Cuban 
“aggression” is to turn facts upside down. And 
it is equally  in co rre c t and u n jus t to 
characterize the Cuban troops - many of 
whom laid down their lives to prevent a South 
African-Zairese takeover of Angola - as 
“mercenaries". It would be just as absurd to 
describe as “ mercenaries” the Chinese 
People's Volunteers in the Korean War; or the 
Chinese who fulfilled their international duty 
in helping the Vietnamese keep their supply 
lines open - and defended - during the Vietnam 
war.
It was the Chinese delegation to the 1957 
Moscow meeting of world communist parties 
which correctly insisted on amending a 
passage in the d ra ft resu lu tio n  about 
“ revolution not being for export” to insist that 
counterrevolution was also not for export and 
that it was the duty of communist parties which
held state power to give every help “ including 
that of their armed forces" to support a people 
which had taken to revolutionary struggle and 
were the object of counterrevolutionary 
intervention. People's China, to its credit, 
upheld this principle in Korea and Vietnam. 
Cuba, to its credit, upheld this principle of 
international solidarity in Angola. This is the 
way history w ill see it.
China’s error in Angola stems from the 
nature of its struggle with the Soviet Union. It 
views the USSR as a fascist, capitalist 
imperialist power bent on world domination, at 
least equal to if not far worse than the US. Such 
an analysis can lead one into a policy-making 
cul-de-sac unless both regional as well as 
global political considerations are kept in 
mind and unless all the varying and often 
co n tra d ic to ry  concre te  c o n d itio n s  are 
objectively understood.
Peking’s Angola mistake was based upon 
th e  a s s u m p tio n  th a t th e  p r in c ip a l 
contradiction in the region was between the 
imperialist interests of both superpowers - 
with the USSR as the main danger - and to 
subordinate all else to preventing Moscow 
from gaining some kind of foothold in Angola 
through the MPLA. The real contradiction was 
between the forces of neocolonialism, backed 
by the US, South Africa and Zaire and the 
aspirations of the people of Angola - led by the 
MPLA and backed by virtually all the 
progressive governments and movements in 
Africa and throughout the world - for 
independence, liberation and social progress.
Fear of possible Soviet hegemony in 
southern Africa - a question I believe the 
African peoples are perfectly prepared to 
decide for themselves in their own interests - 
led China into the impossible position of 
objectively compromising its support for a 
liberation struggle and of jeopardizing its 
considerable prestige among progressive 
African nations. A logical corollary to seeing 
superpow er con ten tion  as everywhere 
supreme or to view Moscow undialectically is 
to ultimately conclude that anyone who 
accepts Soviet aid is suspect and to insist that 
anyth ing  w hich  the USSR does m ust 
automatically be condemned.
Fortunately, this criteria was not applied 
during the Vietnam war and the Vietnamese 
were able to benefit from both Chinese and 
Soviet aid and retain the friendship - as MPLA 
would very much like - of both countries.
